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Abstract 
In December 2014 the European Union (EU) deployed a Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) mission in Ukraine. The mandate of the EU Advisory Mission 
(EUAM) was originally two years, but it has been extended until November 2017. This 
paper examines to what extent EUAM has been successful from the EU’s perspective. 
It does so by assessing to what extent the mission has achieved its (explicit) normative 
objectives and (implicit) strategic objectives. The paper argues that the mission has 
contributed to the EU’s strategic objectives by shaping the milieu in Ukraine but it has 
been less successful in advancing the EU’s normative objectives. However, in the case 
of EUAM, the Union’s strategic and normative interests, although different, have not 
hampered the mission’s overall performance. 
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Introduction 
The most prolonged and deadly crisis in Ukraine’s history since its independence 
began in 2013 as a protest against the government’s decision to abandon plans to 
foster closer trade ties with the European Union (EU).1 The ‘Euromaidan’ protests were, 
however, not only about the trade deal with the EU, but also showed that the public 
demanded reforms after decades of weak governance and a lopsided economy 
controlled by oligarchs and clans.2 The EU had cautiously followed the developments 
in its Eastern neighbourhood, and there was visible interest from certain member states 
to be seen ‘to do something’ to stop the crisis.3 Particularly Russia’s influence in Ukraine 
was perceived as harmful, and the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region in March 
2014 strengthened this assessment. 4  Moreover, Russia’s continued support for the 
Ukrainian separatists further escalated tensions between the Western powers and 
Russia.5 Especially after the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 was shot down over Donetsk 
on 17 July 2014 by Ukrainian separatists backed by Russia, there was strong support 
among EU member states to deploy a mission in Ukraine.6 
On 1 December 2014, the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector 
Reform Ukraine (EUAM) was deployed as part of the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP).7 The purpose of this civilian mission is to mentor and advise the Ukrainian 
officials to deliver a civilian Security Sector Reform (SSR) that would help to stabilise the 
country in the long-run through enhanced democracy and rule of law.8 The concrete 
activities taken are giving strategic advice to reform and develop the civilian security 
sector, hands-on training and projects and facilitation of cooperation between the 
Ukrainian and international actors.9  
                                                          
1 R. MacMahon, “Ukraine in crisis”, London, Council on Foreign Relations, 25 August 2014.  
2 S. Solodkyy & V. Sharlay, “How could the EU accelerate reform in Ukraine?”, Kiev, Institute of 
World Policy, 2015. 
3 B. Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations: Power, Purpose and Domestic 
Politics, New York, Routledge, 2014, p. 172.   
4 N. Mirimanova, “Peacebuilding in Ukraine: What Role for the EU?”, EPLO Civil Society Dialogue 
Network Discussion Paper, no. 8, Brussels, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, 2014, p. 2. 
5 Ibid.   
6 N. Novaky, “Why so soft? The European Union in Ukraine”, Contemporary Security Studies, vol. 
36, no. 2, p. 3. 
7 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision (2014/486/CFSP) of 22 July 2014 on the 
European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine)”, 
Official Journal of the European Union, L331/24, 17 November 2014.     
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid.  
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Although EUAM officially has no direct conflict management involvement in the 
Russian-Ukrainian crisis, 10  it became clear that Ukraine’s decision to sign the 
Association Agreement with the EU in November 2013 partly triggered the conflict.11 
Russia clearly perceives this Association Agreement with the EU in a geopolitical light. 
It is thus possible that the EU does not only have explicit normative objectives to relieve 
the situation in Ukraine but also implicit strategic objectives that it wishes to fulfil 
through EUAM.  
EUAM can therefore be seen as shaping the EU’s external milieu in its Eastern 
neighbourhood,12 and Russia does not belong to the EU’s ‘ring of friends’.13 That said, 
operating through a civilian mission in Ukraine offers the EU an indirect and perhaps 
the only viable channel to counter the Russian action in Ukraine. A successful reform 
of the Ukrainian civilian security sector would be a victory for the ‘soft power’ measures 
used by the EU.14 If the mission turned out be unsuccessful, this could lead to a loss of 
credibility and reputation for the EU, and, even worse, to an increased threat of 
instability in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood.15 
This paper sets out to examine to what extent the EUAM has been a success from the 
EU’s perspective. The evaluation of CSDP missions is a very difficult and sensitive 
endeavour, amongst other things because they are seldom the only EU tool of external 
action in the target country.16 Moreover, ‘success’ has very different meanings for 
different actors. In EUAM’s case, the mission has been ongoing for 27 months but there 
is only one evaluation conducted of its success. This evaluation by Kateryna Zarembo, 
Deputy Director for the Institute of World Policy in Kiev, focuses on examining EUAM 
through its mandate. Zarembo argues that the mandate of the mission is very 
ambitious when it comes to the reforms it attempts to deliver, yet at the same time it 
restricts the mission to solely operate in Kiev.17 Overall, this paper agrees with Zarembo 
                                                          
10 K. Zarembo, “EUAM’s first year: ambitions versus reality”, Policy Brief, Kiev, Institute of World 
Policy, 2015, p. 2.  
11 S. Pifer, “Poroshenko signs EU-Ukraine Association Agreement”, Washington, DC, Brookings 
Institution, 27 June 2014. 
12 A. Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ Power Europe: A Realist Critique”, Journal of European Public 
Policy, vol. 13, no. 2, 2006, p. 217. 
13 R. Prodi, President of the European Commission, “A wider Europe: a proximity policy as a key 
to stability”, speech/02/619, 6th ECSA-World Conference, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002.  
14 Solodkyy & Sharlay, op. cit.  
15 Ibid. 
16 “EU Support for Security Sector Reform: Learning from the EU CSDP Missions and Other EU 
Support in Guinea-Bissau and DRC”, Civil Society Dialogue Network Policy Meeting, Brussels, 16 
May 2011, p. 2. 
17 Zarembo, op. cit., p. 4.  
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that the scope and nature of the mission mandate is crucial in evaluations, but points 
out that the EU’s objectives behind formulating the mandate must be examined in 
order to fully grasp the success of the mission. This paper assumes that examining the 
strategic and normative objectives behind CSDP missions captures both external and 
internal aspects that affect the missions’ success. It assesses EUAM’s success (1) in 
introducing norms in the administrative levels of the security sector in Ukraine, (2) in 
attaining the EU’s strategic objectives through the mission, and (3) in balancing the 
EU’s normative and strategic objectives behind the mission. Examining these three 
different levels of success provides a comprehensive picture of the mission’s overall 
success from the EU’s perspective. The first hypothesis in this paper is that the EU does 
not only have explicit normative objectives to relieve the situation in Ukraine but also 
implicit strategic objectives that it wishes to achieve through EUAM. The paper claims 
that the mission has contributed to the EU’s strategic interests by shaping the milieu in 
Ukraine but it has been less successful in advancing the EU’s normative interests. 
Regarding the balance between normative and strategic interests, the hypothesis is 
that strategic interests of the EU are the dominating interests behind deploying the 
mission, and that they are possibly hindering the overall success of the mission. In this 
regard, the paper finds that the strategic interests behind EUAM have not hampered 
the mission’s success as the strategic and normative objectives largely coincide.   
In the first section, the paper explores EUAM’s success in achieving its normative goals 
by drawing on ‘normative power Europe’. This approach gives insight into the values 
the EU is seeking to project to others.18 According to Ian Manners, such values include 
democracy, liberty, peace, good governance and respect for human rights.19 The 
subsequent section examines EUAM’s success in realising its implicit strategic 
objectives by drawing on realist theory. What is crucial in realist theory is that it sees 
states as the main actors in international affairs.20 States’ actions are primarily driven 
by their need to guarantee their security, and thus their survival in the anarchic system 
of international politics.21  Overall, normative power Europe and realist theory capture 
the two opposite ends of the EU’s motivations behind its Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), namely normative and strategic interests. 
 
                                                          
18  I. Manners, “Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, p. 236.    
19 Ibid.  
20 J. Mearsheimer, The tragedy of great power politics, New York, Norton, 2001. 
21 Ibid.  
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Normative interests 
Evaluating the success of CSDP missions is methodologically problematic as the 
impact of a mission in a certain context is hard to separate from the other factors that 
affect the situation on the ground. Therefore, this section examines how well EUAM 
implemented the mission mandate. 22  Evidently, efficient implementation of the 
mandate does not guarantee a beneficial impact on the ground.23 Yet, as the scope 
of this paper is to evaluate the success of the mission from the EU’s point of view, how 
the mission fulfils its mandate is a crucial starting point. The structure of this section is 
thus threefold: first, it looks at EUAM’s capabilities in bringing about normative 
standards, as mentioned in the mandate. This will be followed by an examination of 
the level of local ownership of the mission and the willingness of locals to absorb the 
reforms. Lastly, it evaluates to what extent the possible normative objectives achieved 
are sustainable in the long run.    
 
Normative standards 
The EU has been characterised as a ‘normative power’ guarding universal norms and 
principles in its external action.24 A reflection of this can be seen in EUAM’s mandate 
as one the aims of the mission is to introduce normative standards, such as 
transparency and accountability, to the civilian security sector in Ukraine. 25  By 
definition these standards reflect what is considered to be the normal state of affairs. 
Normative standards in Ukraine are thus compared to the ones of the EU, assuming 
that the EU constitutes a normative power.26 Yet, these normative goals are not solely 
the EU’s invention, but have also been demanded by the Ukrainian public. However, 
the people in power are not always as enthusiastic about reforms given their vested 
interests.27 According to an official of the European External Action Service (EEAS), 
“corruption in the Balkans is peanuts compared to the situation in Ukraine”.28 This 
corruption extends to the civilian security sector.  
                                                          
22 T. Tardy, “CSDP in Action - What Contribution to International Security?”, Chaillot Papers, no. 
134, Paris, EUISS, 2015, p. 36. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Manners, op. cit., p. 236.  
25 “Mandate”, EUAM Ukraine, retrieved 29 March 2016, http://www.euam-ukraine.eu/en/ 
about_euam/the_mandate. 
26 Manners, op. cit.  
27 Interview with an official, CPPC, EEAS, Brussels, 3 February 2016. 
28 Ibid.  
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Nevertheless, there have been some successes regarding introducing normative 
standards in Ukraine. First, EUAM has managed to create a good working relationship 
with the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) established in mid-April 
2015. The creation of this body is remarkable as there has never been a specialised 
body monitoring anti-corruption activities before in Ukraine.29 EUAM has, since NABU’s 
establishment, contributed with strategic advice and IT equipment in order to facilitate 
the work of the detectives.30 These efforts, which deviate from the purely advisory 
mandate, are essential as EUAM cannot tackle corruption in Ukraine by simply hoping 
that the EU’s values diffuse through its operation, as suggested by normative power 
Europe theory.31  
With regards to public trust, one of the missed opportunities is the patrol police reform 
in which EUAM has not been involved.32 This reform has been ‘branded’ as a “force 
for change”,33 and perhaps as the most successful reform in the post-revolutionary 
period in Ukraine.34 To explain its absence, EUAM has insisted that its limited mandate 
restricts the exercise of powers.35 Yet the limited mandate has not prevented EUAM 
from cooperating with the Lviv regional police in the city of Sambir on a project that 
has many elements in common with the patrol police reform.  
Generally, political pressure can be seen as a tool for EUAM to reach its objective of 
introducing normative standards in Ukraine because it is to be expected that 
normative reforms will be met with resistance for change in the security sector. 36 
According to Zarembo, Deputy Director for the Institute of World Policy in Kiev, the 
Ukrainians even expect political pressure from the mission.37 She believes, however, 
that the mission does not meet the preconditions for delivering. 38  Unfortunately, 
Zarembo is right about Brussels and the EU Delegation to Ukraine not wanting to see 
                                                          
29 H. Kokhan, “Building anticorruption system in Ukraine: current status and challenges”, Paper 
presented at the European Academy in Grunewald Understanding Governance Virtuous 
Cycles: Who Succeeded and Why, Berlin, 8-12 July 2015, p. 1.  
30 “EUAM hands over IT equipment to NABU”, EEAS, 13 October 2015.  
31 Manners, op. cit.  
32 Zarembo, op. cit., p. 6.  
33 E. Marat, “The problem with Ukrainian police reform”, Foreign Policy, 29 December 2015.  
34 Zarembo, op. cit.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Solodkyy & Sharlay, op. cit., p. 15. 
37 Interview with Kateryna Zarembo, Deputy Director, Institute of World Policy, via Skype, 9 
March 2016. 
38 Ibid.  
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EUAM become a political player.39 The current procedure is that the mission needs to 
respect the political guidance it receives from the Delegation, and therefore cannot 
act independently. 40  Yet having two EU organs in Ukraine could still be efficient 
provided that they work in a close conjunction. In Ukraine, however, this is not the 
case.  
In line with the normative power Europe approach, EUAM is relying on advising and on 
giving an example by being present in Ukraine. Given the level of corruption in Ukraine, 
it would be naive to believe that EUAM could have an impact by simply giving advice 
on how to tackle the problems. According to an EEAS official, the Ukrainians do not 
require advice on what reforms are needed, but on how to implement these reforms.41 
Therefore, if EUAM really wishes to achieve its objectives of bringing about normative 
standards, it needs to exert political pressure on the Ukrainian government.42 What 
seems to currently stop this from happening is the internal rivalry between the mission 
and the EU Delegation that does not wish to see the mission become more 
independent. Thus, although the mission has successfully cooperated with some 
Ukrainian actors in promoting normative principles, EUAM has not been as successful 
as it could be in introducing values.  
 
Local buy-in 
The extent to which EUAM has managed to introduce normative standards in Ukraine 
is closely linked to the local buy-in which is also an indicator of the mission’s success. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of the whole mission depends largely upon the willingness 
of the local actors, both officials and civil society, to co-design the numerous 
programmes.43 If the buy-in is missing, the local actors may become ‘spoilers’ of the 
mission44 and a threat to the mission’s goals.45 As normative power Europe holds, the 
EU wants to be seen as a normative actor interested in creating a democratic society 
in Ukraine instead of being seen as actor imposing its own values on the Ukrainians. 
Therefore, local buy-in can be divided into two equally important dimensions: first, it is 
                                                          
39 Interview with an official, Coordination and Cooperation Team, EUAM mission, via Skype, 16 
February 2016.  
40 Ibid. 
41 Interview with an official, anti-corruption component, Justice Sector Reforms in Ukraine, via 
Skype, 9 March 2016.   
42 Mirimanova, op. cit., p. 1.  
43 Tardy, op. cit., p. 14.  
44 Interview with an official, Coordination and Cooperation Team, EUAM mission, via Skype, 16 
February 2016. 
45 Tardy, op. cit., p. 15. 
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about EUAM’s ability to empower local actors and, second, it is about the willingness 
and absorption capacity of the stakeholders.46  
 
Empowerment of local actors 
Although EUAM has always acknowledged the importance of having local 
stakeholders on board, it was not well understood how greatly the philosophy 
regarding the civilian security sector differs in post-Soviet countries.47 In Europe, the 
civilian security sector consists of law-enforcement agencies and other agencies that 
are in place to ensure the security of citizens.48 In the post-Soviet countries, however, 
the civilian security sector is hardly a known term and the purpose of the security sector 
is above all perceived as guarding the security of the state. 49  These differences 
regarding the concept of security service created a difficult context for EUAM. This 
context combined with the purely advisory approach taken by the mission gave the 
local stakeholders the impression that the mission just came to “tell how to do things 
better”.50 In general, it seems that EUAM attempted to tackle the most challenging 
task of empowering the local actors with the weakest tool available: advising.51  
According to an EEAS official, “the EU always knew that it would have to amend 
EUAM’s mandate”.52 This raises a worrying question regarding the planning of the 
mission before deploying it if the ideology was to ‘learn-by-doing’ and fix the 
miscalculations on the go. What is clear, however, is that for the first few months, the 
mission did not have an internal strategy, and yet it was expected to advise the 
Ukrainians.53 On top of this, the mission had recruited very experienced personnel but 
their expertise was not what was actually required to empower the local authorities.54 
An expert hired to work at the mission in the beginning of its mandate described it as 
commonplace that EUAM sent its personnel, who had no experience of working with 
a ministry, to advise the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs. 55  Given the loss of 
                                                          
46 Ibid., p. 47.  
47 Zarembo, op. cit., p. 5. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Interview with an official, Coordination and Cooperation Team, EUAM mission, via Skype, 16 
February 2016.  
51 Ibid.  
52 Interview with an official, geographical desk, EEAS, Brussels, 13 January 2016.  
53 Interview with an official, anti-corruption component, Justice Sector Reforms in Ukraine, via 
Skype, 9 March 2016.   
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid. 
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credibility, EUAM’s functioning might be hampered by Ukrainian authorities prioritising 
cooperation with other big actors such as the US, Japan and Canada.  
The lack of research and planning prior to deploying EUAM reveals that there was a 
general impression that the mission would just come to Ukraine to help the locals to 
implement their own vision.56 Naturally, this rather naive strategy needed adjusting 
when it became clear that there simply is no shared vision of what the Ukrainian 
security service should look like. Even with the amended strategy, EUAM was not 
prepared for the level of corruption in the security sector. The core of the mission is to 
render the civilian security sector trustworthy in the eyes of the public but how to 
achieve this in a corrupt society where no one appears to be responsible for 
anything?57 
 
Willingness and absorption capacity of the stakeholders 
When examining the willingness of the Ukrainians to adopt reforms more in detail, it 
becomes evident that EUAM has not well communicated what type of reforms it tries 
to advance. 58  As a starting point, an advisory mission in Kiev was not what the 
Ukrainians had wanted. Their original wish was to have a monitoring mission with a 
regional presence around Ukraine, especially in the areas where fighting was 
happening.59 As a result of the EU not agreeing to this type of mission, there was a high 
level of disappointment towards the mission even before its deployment. 60 
Furthermore, since the mandate of the mission became an object of political dispute 
between the European leaders, the Ukrainian authorities felt that their opinions, as the 
direct beneficiaries, were not taken into account in the formulation of the mandate.61  
Consequently, EUAM’s mandate was based too much on the advisory part without 
actually taking into account the Ukrainians’ needs.62 Thus, not only had the EU offered 
the Ukrainians a type of mission that they did not want, but it also failed to map out 
what the local needs were and how it could address them within the mission’s 
                                                          
56 Interview with an official, Coordination and Cooperation Team, EUAM mission, via Skype, 16 
February 2016. 
57 K. Liik, “What else could we have done? Ukraine after Vilnius”, London, European Council on 
Foreign Relations, 28 November 2014.  
58 Zarembo, op. cit., p. 5.  
59 Interview with an official, CPPC, EEAS, Brussels, 3 February 2016. 
60 Interview with Kateryna Zarembo, Deputy Director, Institute of World Policy, via Skype, 9 
March 2016.  
61 Zarembo, op. cit., p. 4.  
62 Interview with an official, anti-corruption component, Justice Sector Reforms in Ukraine, via 
Skype, 9 March 2016.   
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mandate. There was hope that the 2015 revised mission mandate would tackle these 
drawbacks but EUAM’s credibility as an actor empowering the local stakeholders has 
already suffered.  
Another question is whether the mandate is too ambitious and broad, or actually too 
narrow. According to Zarembo, the EUAM’s goals are currently too all-encompassing 
to be achieved.63 She believes that EUAM needs to prioritise and set more narrow 
goals for itself in order to have a real impact.64 Currently, the mission is targeting all 
areas, in accordance with the normative power Europe approach, ranging from 
restructuring law enforcement and security service to increasing the level of public 
confidence in the police with an initial mandate of three years.65  
Some experts, however, believe that EUAM should have a bigger picture in mind when 
operating in Ukraine.66 According to an EEAS official, this could be achieved by having 
more decision-making at the mission level since decision-makers in Brussels do not 
always understand the local conditions when setting up priorities and planning their 
implementation.67 Given the different interpretations of the mission mandate among 
experts, it is no surprise that the Ukrainians do not know what to expect from the 
mandate. This is dangerous as instead of empowering the local stakeholders to deliver 
reforms, EUAM may create a “capability-expectations gap”68 implying that the local 
stakeholders will expect more from EUAM than it can realistically achieve.  
The lack of visibility is another shortcoming of EUAM’s performance.69 Without visibility 
it cannot be expected that the Ukrainian public knows what the mission is doing, and 
thus the general public cannot be expected to absorb or co-design the reforms with 
EUAM. It is not unusual that CSDP missions in the post-Soviet countries have very low 
visibility, yet the drawback is that the public may misunderstand the mission’s 
objectives and nature.70 A study commissioned by EUAM itself shows that the mission 
                                                          
63 Interview with Kateryna Zarembo, Deputy Director, Institute of World Policy, via Skype, 9 
March 2016. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 2015/2249/CFSP of 3 December 2015 on 
amending decision 2014/486/CFSP”, Official Journal of the European Union, L318/ 38, 4 
December 2015.  
66 Interview with an official, CPPC, EEAS, Brussels, 3 February 2016. 
67 Interview with an official, Coordination and Cooperation Team, EUAM mission, via Skype, 16 
February 2016.   
68 C. Hill, “The capability-expectations gap or conceptualising Europe’s international role”, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no. 3, 1993, pp 305-328.  
69 Ibid.  
70 Zarembo, op. cit., p. 8. 
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is the most unknown project compared to other international projects and 
organisations present in Ukraine.71  
 
Sustainability of reforms 
Evidently, EUAM aims at delivering reforms that have a sustainable impact. 
Nevertheless, for the mission to have a sustainable impact two factors are required: 
first, EUAM must cooperate efficiently with other donors with similar objectives. Second, 
there must be a common vision between the mission, the Ukrainian officials and the 
civil society on how the civilian security service should look like.  
 
Cooperation with donors 
Regarding cooperation with other donors, it is a well-known fact that donor 
organisations and governments often apply their long-term priorities regardless of the 
possible duplication with other actors. 72  In EUAM’s case, however, the fiercest 
competition comes from within. The chemistry between the mission and the EU 
Delegation to Ukraine has been questionable.73 This is one of the biggest problems for 
EUAM as it aims to reform the security sector, which is by definition a highly sensitive 
and political matter, with only technical tools such as advising and training.74 However, 
these tools, which are in line with the normative power Europe image, are not enough. 
Political tasks such as SSR need to be tackled with political tools in addition to technical 
tools.75 Yet the mission lacks political tools because the EU Delegation appears to be 
jealous guarding its monopoly of political power.76 This mistrust has also led to the 
Delegation not sufficiently helping the mission to deal with Ukrainian politicians, which 
should be common practice. Partly, this is explained by the personnel at the 
Delegation being mainly Commission technocrats who refrain from political thinking, 
                                                          
71 Ibid.  
72 Solodkyy & Sharlay, op. cit., p. 9. 
73 Interview with an official, Coordination and Cooperation Team, EUAM mission, via Skype, 16 
February 2016. 
74 L. Van de Goor & E. Van Veen, “Less post-conflict: The value of SSR to more developed 
countries”, in M. Sedra (ed.), The future of security sector reform, Ontario, The Centre for 
International Governance Innovation, 2010, p. 96. 
75  R. Parkes, “Integrating EU Defence and Migration Policies in the Mediterranean”, FRIDE 
Working Paper, no. 125, Madrid, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo 
Exterior, November 2014, p. 14. 
76 Interview with an official, Coordination and Cooperation Team, EUAM mission, via Skype, 16 
February 2016. 
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and thus do not value cooperation with EUAM.77 Therefore, the rivalry between the 
two organs renders EUAM incapable of having a sustainable impact.  
In addition to the tension between the Delegation and the mission, the EU project 
“Support to Justice Sector Reforms in Ukraine” is largely ignoring EUAM although they 
have very similar goals.78 In this regard, however, the mission is not perceived as a 
competitor by the project as the project is financially better placed to implement 
reforms than EUAM.79 Currently, the cooperation between the mission and the project 
is based on personal chemistry and goodwill of the personnel, which evidently does 
not offer a very solid basis for cooperation.80  
 
Common vision 
Regarding the common vision, coordination between EU bodies is essential in order to 
deliver reforms with a sustainable impact. However, even more crucial is the creation 
of a common vision between the mission and local stakeholders who are directly 
affected by the civilian security sector. Presently, there seems to be unnecessary 
blaming on both sides regarding the lack of vision on how to reform the security 
sector.81 For the EUAM personnel, it came as a surprise that there was no local vision 
that the mission could have helped to implement.82 This naive approach evaporated 
rather quickly when the mission learned that the Ukrainian institutions were too weak 
to analyse the situation properly and enforce the respect of rules.83 Nevertheless, this 
should not become an issue as it is challenging even for European countries to have 
a common vision.84  
Yet, the mission’s attitude has surprised many Ukrainians who argue that is unrealistic 
for EUAM to expect that Ukraine would have a vision when there are no resources and 
no proper expertise on how to implement reforms.85 Moreover, the general feeling is 
that EUAM is lacking a strategic vision due to an improper mapping of local needs.86 
                                                          
77 Ibid.   
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid.   
81 Interview with an official, CPPC, EEAS, Brussels, 3 February 2016. 
82 Interview with an official, Coordination and Cooperation Team, EUAM mission, via Skype, 16 
February 2016.   
83 Ibid.  
84 Ibid.   
85 Interview with Kateryna Zarembo, Deputy Director, Institute of World Policy, via Skype, 9 
March 2016. 
86 Ibid.   
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Therefore, the fact that the mission does not know what to offer to the Ukrainians to 
facilitate reforms should not be blamed on the lack of a vision on the Ukrainian side.87 
In order to be successful, the mission needs to abandon the expectation that the 
Ukrainians would have a strategic vision. Also, the Ukrainians must stop expecting the 
mission to provide them with a readymade vision. Instead, the strategic vision has to 
be created together whilst taking into account the civil society’s expectations and 
concerns. Otherwise, the reforms will hardly have a sustainable impact.  In this regard, 
EUAM may use its advisory capacity to urge the Ukrainian leadership to enhance 
communication with civil society.88 
To conclude, it is clear that most of EUAM’s normative objectives are impossible to be 
achieved in the short run. What has been evaluated in this section, however, are the 
EUAM’s efforts in ensuring that possible reforms will be sustainable. Factors deemed 
crucial in this regard are cooperation and a shared strategic vision. Unfortunately, 
internal cooperation with other EU bodies still hinders the mission’s efforts in ensuring a 
sustainable impact. When it comes to a shared strategic vision, much work remains to 
be done. Both sides seemed to expect that the other side would have a readymade 
vision that could just be implemented. The lack of vision should not be seen as an 
obstacle, but as a chance for creating a shared strategic vision including sustainable 
reforms. The aforementioned factors combined with the lack of visibility of the mission, 
the unclear mission mandate and insufficient research before the deployment of the 
mission render EUAM rather unsuccessful from the normative point of view. Moreover, 
it implies that EUAM has perhaps been more motivated by other objectives, namely 
strategic objectives.  
 
Strategic interests 
From a realist perspective, it can be argued that, in addition to normative objectives, 
EUAM is also driven by broader geopolitical objectives.89 Although the mandate only 
allows the mission to mentor, advise, and with the revised mandate to train the civilian 
security sector personnel, realists see CSDP missions as instruments for member states 
to harness coercive diplomacy and managing crises with ‘hard’ power.90 However, in 
EUAM’s case, it must be kept in mind that it does not include any military aspects which 
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most realist scholars focus on in CSDP missions.91 Nevertheless, the notion that the 
multifaceted nature of conflict management has culminated in including activities 
such as institution-building and the rule of law in CSDP missions should not fool the 
reader to think that the mission is free of self-interest.92 On the contrary, “the multi-actor 
and multi-level nature of contemporary crisis management” means that no security 
actor can have an impact without taking into account the broader picture that 
includes economic, political and military components.93 
Thus, from the realist point of view, having a civilian mission can be seen as a strategic 
choice by the EU as it seems to only serve the EU’s normative objectives shared with 
the Ukrainians. Nevertheless, it also has the potential to fulfill the EU’s broader 
geopolitical objectives related to strategy, geography and relative power.94 Naturally, 
the mandate of the mission does not outline the EU’s strategic objectives, and thus the 
performance of the mission structure in fulfilling the mandate cannot be directly 
evaluated, as it was done in the section on normative objectives. In order to define 
how successful the mission has been in realising its strategic objectives, this paper will 
first examine how well the EUAM has managed to push through reforms of its liking and, 
second, the mission’s capacity to offer an alternative to the Russian model. These two 
factors are derived from realist theory, according to which states are motivated not 
only by a balance of power but also an ideological balance. Assessing these 
indicators will reveal how successful EUAM has been from the point of view of the EU’s 
strategic interests.  
 
EUAM’s ability to push through reforms 
In order to define EUAM’s ability to push through reforms, three aspects are being 
measured: EUAM’s internal coherence, understanding of the structural context and 
expertise of personnel These three aspects provide a basis that allows EUAM to push 
through reforms of its liking, and thus depict EUAM’s capacity to advance the EU’s 
strategic objectives.  
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Coherence   
For the mission to effectively push through reforms, it needs to be internally coherent. 
This refers to the coherence among EU member states that support not only the 
mission’s mandate, but also its day-today operations. CSDP missions can be seen, in 
the light of realist theory, as EU member states’ strategic instruments and as reflecting 
their strategic objectives. Reaching an EU-wide position is often complex,95 and in 
EUAM’s case, the drafting of the mission mandate was especially problematic96 given 
their security-oriented nature.97 Consequently, member states’ control of the process 
was strongly influenced by their broader policy towards Russia.98 Some member states 
naturally have stronger interests and policy priorities in maintaining a well-functioning 
relationship with Russia. This gave the negotiations a difficult starting point.99  
In the negotiation process, ‘hawkish’ and ‘dovish’ member states emerged. The 
‘hawks’ urged the EU to join the Ukrainian side and act decisively in helping them to 
ensure stability, sovereignty and integrity.100 The ‘doves’, on the other hand, consisted 
of countries reluctant to take any sides because of strong bilateral relations with 
Russia.101 Due to these divergent views, the mandate of EUAM turned out to be “a 
political compromise”.102 For the Ukrainian authorities, it was a disappointment103 since 
they had not wanted a mere advisory mission in Kiev but a mission that would clearly 
confirm the EU’s support for Ukraine. From a realist perspective, this is a clear reflection 
of the EU’s strategic thinking behind the mission. Yet, the division between member 
states reveals the incoherent backing of EUAM.  
It seems obvious that a mandate described as a political compromise is not ideal for 
EUAM to push through reforms of its liking, especially if it does not respond to the 
recipient state’s requests either. In accordance with realist theory, the strategic 
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objective of the EU is to have a stable neighbour as Ukraine’s security directly affects 
the EU’s security.104 In order to stabilise Ukraine, EUAM would need to be able to 
introduce normative standards that would strengthen the currently incapable 
institutions. However, tackling the deep running corruption with a weak mandate is 
close to impossible and reveals the internal incoherence of the EU as an external actor. 
Therefore, EUAM’s success in pushing through reforms depends largely on the 
willingness of the Ukrainians to accept these reforms.  
In addition to the mandate, EUAM’s day-to-day actions in Ukraine reflect its internal 
coherence or the lack of it, and thus the ability to bring about reforms. Surprisingly, 
day-to-day operations show that the vague mandate actually works in the mission’s 
favour because it leaves wide margins for interpretation. As discussed in the previous 
section, there have been reforms that EUAM has not taken part in referring to its limited 
mandate, and yet it has worked on very similar reforms. This reveals that the mission, in 
line with realist theory, is acting as a strategic player and choosing which reforms to 
engage with. The ones that do not contribute to the EU’s foreign policy objectives will 
have less importance even if they respond to the needs of the country in crisis.105 
However, the most ideal situation for the mission is when the strategic and normative 
interests coincide. An excellent example of this is the Ukrainian State Border Guard 
Service which EUAM has successfully advised to adopt and implement a 
communication and public relations strategy. 106  The Ukrainians had themselves 
recognised the need for an improved communications strategy but this also 
coincided with the EUAM’s strategic objective to counter the Russian border guards, 
who were faster and better organised in dealing with messages concerning the 
situation on the Russian-Ukrainian border.107  
Nonetheless, there are deeper internal coherence problems. According to an anti-
corruption advisor previously part of the mission, there is an endemic problem 
regarding advising.108 At the moment, the revised mandate allows EUAM to engage 
more in training activities but the problem lies in the mission personnel being reluctant 
to do so.109 The personnel is used to, to put it frankly, “giving advice wearing a suit” 
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without actually having to take part in the field work.110 In this respect it is clear that 
there is need for more coherence regarding the experts hired and the training they 
receive.111  
 
Understanding of the structural context 
The second factor EUAM needs to succeed is a sound understanding of the 
environment in which it operates. This implies that, in order for the mission to bring 
about reforms, it has to understand the problems that need to be tackled and what 
policy responses are required.112 According to an EEAS official, “EUAM is only doing 
what the Ukrainians have asked it to do”.113 However, this does not take into account 
the oligarchs who have for over 20 years used a ‘pick-and-mix’ approach to reap the 
benefits from both the EU and Russia.114 These oligarchs provide Russia with a tool to 
delay or even jeopardise the reforms the EUAM tries to achieve.115 Put differently, “the 
biggest threat to Ukraine is not Russia but the Ukrainians themselves”.116 Therefore, the 
opposition is likely to manifest itself in the form of low commitment to the 
implementation of reforms.  
Overall, it seems that an insufficient understanding of the structural context in Ukraine 
undermines EUAM’s ability to push through reforms. When it comes to the problems 
identified, the mission lacks awareness of the level of political resistance in Ukraine, 
supported by Russia. The main obstacle to reforms are indeed the corrupt Ukrainian 
officials. However, in order to grasp the whole picture, EUAM needs to take into 
account Russia’s actions in the region. For Russia, Ukraine is a “crucial test case which 
will either prove or dismiss the credibility of its Great Power ambitions”.117 It is worth 
noting that the EUAM does not seem to have considered this. Going forward, the 
mission must take into account the possibility that by trying to push through reforms it 
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may alienate Kiev from Moscow.118 In line with realist theory, this is likely to incite Russia 
to act assertively and focus on undermining the reforms with the help of corrupt 
Ukrainian officials.  
Not properly understanding the structural context it operates in leads to EUAM not 
responding to the problems with the right tools. EUAM seems to rely on having more 
‘power of attraction’ than Russia and trust the long-standing ‘European choice’ of 
Ukraine.119 This weakens EUAM’s chances of pushing through reforms as it does not 
take into account alternatives. Therefore, it is time for the mission to realise that it can 
only have a limited impact with advising and mentoring, and if it really wants to 
achieve its strategic goals, it must admit that it has entered into a geopolitical game 
with Russia and use political pressure accordingly.120  
 
Personnel’s expertise 
The third factor that affects EUAM’s ability to push through reforms is its personnel’s 
expertise. Personnel with the right expertise would understand the Ukrainian realities 
and be able to use the political environment to advance the reforms that are deemed 
important. However, it has not been a secret that the EUAM experts feel overwhelmed 
with the post-Soviet vertical power structure of the security sector.121 Simply put, EUAM 
personnel lacks the experience of working in such an institutional environment.122 This 
has two implications for the mission: first, it must rely more on Brussels regarding 
strategic advice and, second, its capacity to advise and mentor might be questioned.  
When it comes to strategic advice, some Ukrainian officials have indeed opted for 
cooperating directly with the EU institutions in Brussels instead of the mission on matters 
concerning SSR.123 Their reasoning behind this move was that the mission would have 
had to consult Brussels in any case which would have taken more time than the direct 
communication.124 There have also been cases where Ukrainian ministries have had 
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to wait for months for mission experts to arrive in Kiev to advise them on government 
plans.125 To some extent the fault is in the mission’s structure but the personnel’s lack of 
expertise contributes to it. Thus, the slowness of the mission to respond to Ukrainian 
requests makes the EUAM a reactive player instead of a proactive strategic player.  
Regarding the credibility of EUAM, the Ukrainians had directly communicated to the 
EU that the success of the mission depended on who is coming.126 Therefore, if EUAM 
wishes to advise high-ranking Ukrainian officials, it must send experts that have the 
necessary qualifications.127 Currently, the mission has very experienced personnel but 
their expertise does not match Ukraine’s needs.128 This compromises EUAM’s chances 
of being an actor whose advice is appreciated. If the mission wants to achieve its 
strategic goals, it has to start thinking more strategically and hire experts from Eastern 
Europe and the Baltic states for whom it will be easier to understand the local 
conditions in Ukraine.129 
 
EUAM’s capacity to offer an alternative to the Russian model 
Already in 2013, the EU member states were of the opinion that “it was necessary to 
‘rescue’ Ukraine before it could drift further in Russia’s direction”.130 Although all the 
claims that EUAM would have something to do with Russia’s actions in Ukraine have 
been firmly denied in public,131 the mission is a way of showing both Ukraine and Russia 
that the EU matters.132 EUAM is interested in stabilising Ukraine given its location in the 
EU’s neighbourhood, and in order to do so, it has to reduce the Russian destabilising 
effect.133 This paper draws on the Hobbesian understanding of world politics as a 
constant competition in which international actors try to advance their interests and 
control the others.134 Therefore, if EUAM is to encounter Russian hegemony in its ‘near 
abroad’, it needs to have the capacity to offer alternatives to the Soviet legacy that 
persists in the Ukrainian security sector. Russia seems to have understood that war 
today is not about destroying the enemy, but about eroding the values and norms 
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promoted by it.135 This means that the mission must make the reforms attractive to the 
Ukrainians, so that they will not lean more towards the Russian model. Moreover, EUAM 
needs to have the right tools at its disposal to counter the coercion that Russia uses to 
keep Ukraine under its control. Therefore, the attractiveness of the mission and the tools 
at its disposal need to be assessed.    
 
Attractiveness of EUAM to the Ukrainians  
The first factor that affects EUAM’s capacity to offer an alternative to the Russian 
model is how attractive EUAM is to the Ukrainians. This question is seldom raised 
perhaps because the EU is used to relying on having more ‘power of attraction’ than 
Russia.136 However, EUAM exhibits some characteristics that confirm that the EU has 
stepped up its game in order to counter Russia’s actions in their shared 
neighbourhood. One of these signs is the timing of the deployment of EUAM. 137 
According to the Treaty of Lisbon, CSDP missions are post-crisis tools.138 Yet EUAM was 
deployed during the Russian-Ukrainian crisis.139 This is a unique arrangement in the 
history of CSDP missions and strongly points to the direction of the EU wanting to give 
both Ukraine and Russia a political sign.140 For the Ukrainians, it was a sign that the EU 
will stand by Ukraine and help it to retain its stability, sovereignty and integrity.141 For 
Russia, it was a sign that the EU is willing to engage in normative rivalry.142 On the EU’s 
side it was understood that EUAM would “affect relations with Russia”.143 Nevertheless, 
the EU went ahead with EUAM.  
The early history of the mission shows that although the beginning of EUAM can be 
described as slightly chaotic, the Ukrainian ministries and agencies overcame their 
initial disappointment and welcomed the mission.144 Although it is likely that political 
leaders in Ukraine sometimes act as if they could achieve reforms by declaration 
rather than by bringing forward actual structural changes, they recognised that what 
the EUAM was offering would be popular among the general public.145 The mission did 
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not provide a wide geographical presence as originally hoped for, but it opened a 
channel for democratic reforms that the Ukrainian public had yearned for.  
Overall, it looks as if EUAM has succeeded quite well in countering the Russian 
influence in Ukraine by offering an attractive alternative, normative model of 
governance. Nevertheless, the mission should be careful to avoid making the 
Ukrainians feel that they are only a token in the EU’s geopolitical game with Russia.146 
EUAM should clearly communicate with the Ukrainian counterparts that Ukraine’s 
security will not be on the table in the negotiations with Russia.147 However, Russia is 
successfully driving a wedge between different EU member states.148 One can already 
detect many differing positions among member states ranging from détente with 
Russia at almost any cost to a strong defence of norms and values.149  
An illustration which shows the diverging opinions between member states was the 
negative outcome of the Dutch referendum in April 2016 on the Association 
Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine.150 Whether the voters were fully 
aware of the implications of the No vote or used the referendum to vote against the 
government is not important for the purpose of this paper.151 What matters is that 
Ukraine, and through that EUAM, risk becoming political tokens for the EU member 
states. This raises the question whether the mission mandate will be extended after 
2017 given that the member states already disagree about the strategies concerning 
Ukraine. For the Ukrainians, the current events have also shown that the EU is not such 
a normative actor as it wishes everyone to believe. 152  The reforms EUAM tries to 
achieve are largely beneficial for the Ukrainians but the country is not blind to the EU’s 
strategic interests behind deploying the mission.  
 
Strategic tools 
The second factor affecting EUAM’s capacity to offer an alternative to the Russian 
model is whether the mission has the right tools for countering Russia’s ever more 
assertive actions in Ukraine. The member states had two options when designing the 
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mission: first, to have a very visible mission speaking out against Russia’s territorial 
violations, or to have a mission that rather focused on working behind the scenes 
without confronting Russia about its actions. They opted for the latter and pointed, in 
addition to Russia’s interference, at the corrupt and dysfunctional government 
structure and law-enforcement agencies in Ukraine as causes for the crisis.153 Rhetoric 
like this can be found repeatedly in the Management Concept for Ukraine and in the 
statements of European officials.154  
Thus, instead of directly counterbalancing Russia’s actions, member states have 
chosen to have a mission that is very critical towards all actors, even the Ukrainian 
security service structure.155 This somewhat reduces the visibility of the mission but at 
the same time it is a clear sign that the EU is not going to play Russia’s propaganda 
game. Instead, the member states have decided to let the actions of EUAM speak for 
themselves. Thus, at first sight it may look as if EUAM possesses almost no tools to 
counter Russia’s actions in Ukraine, but not having many tools turns out to be a 
strategic choice of the member states.  
While it is true that Russia has the comparative advantage of being able to take 
unilateral decision and consequently impose them quickly, EUAM’s problem is not that 
it is not addressing the conflict or does not have the right tools to do so. On the 
contrary, as mentioned above, the mission is trying to achieve a sustainable reform in 
Ukraine. The EU has a long history of implementing SSR and it knows that SSR is heavily 
dependent on wider democratic progress and consolidation.156 With a successful SSR, 
Russia’s ability to influence the Ukrainian security sector would also be curbed.157 Thus, 
with advising and training projects, EUAM attempts to strengthen Ukraine’s capacity 
to counter Russia. In line with realist theory, this action is strategic as it allows the EU to 
avoid countering Russia’s interference itself.  
This section has evaluated EUAM’s capabilities in pushing through reforms by 
examining the mission’s internal coherence, its understanding of the structural context 
it operates in and its personnel’s expertise as well as the mission’s capacity to offer an 
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alternative to the Russian model through its attractiveness and tools at its disposal. So 
far, the mission has made progress towards achieving its strategic objectives. The 
mission has eliminated most of the friction that emerged when formulating the 
mandate of EUAM. Still, the mandate remains a political compromise and thus offers 
an ambiguous basis for the mission. On the one hand, it might make it harder for the 
mission to act assertively as its powers are very limited. On the other hand, it offers the 
mission an opportunity to exploit the vague wording in it.  
However, understanding the conditions in Ukraine remains an obstacle for the 
achievement of EUAM’s strategic objectives. The mission is still reluctant to realise the 
geopolitical implications of its actions and how deeply Russia is involved in Ukraine. 
Lastly, the experts at EUAM are not suitable for the mission’s goal of pushing through 
reforms. They lack crucial experience of post-Soviet security sector conditions which 
makes the mission very dependent on Brussels and consequently operationally slow. 
Yet, the Ukrainians willingness to engage in reforms delivered by EUAM and the 
mission’s general attractiveness have enabled EUAM to achieve some of it strategic 
objectives.   
On the whole, this section reveals that there are strategic objectives behind EUAM and 
that, in comparison to the achievement of normative objectives, strategic interests 
have been better achieved by the mission. Therefore, from a strategic angle, EUAM 
can be seen as rather successful.  
 
Are the explicit strategic objectives behind EUAM hindering the success of the mission? 
The analysis shows that the EU’s approach to Ukraine cannot be completely separated 
from the EU’s approach to Russia. As a result, EUAM exhibits both explicit normative 
and implicit strategic objectives of the Union. Interestingly, these interests seem to 
largely coincide instead of contradicting each other. Nevertheless, one should notice 
that although the stabilisation of the neighbourhood happens to coincide with the 
explicit normative objectives of human rights, democracy and rule of law, the reasons 
behind EUAM trying to achieve these end goals differ.158 Thus, the argument in this 
paper is that the EU has normative objectives it tries to realise through EUAM but the 
strategic interests are the driving force behind launching the mission in Ukraine.  
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The first indicator for this was the timing of the mission’s deployment. Ukraine had long 
before the crisis broke out expressed its keenness to adopt the European model and 
even asked for help for this highly complex task.159 All this was well-known in Brussels 
and yet the problems were not seen as urgent enough to send a CSDP mission until 
Russia started to destabilise the country. In line with realist theory the EU came to 
acknowledge the inevitable competition between national interests that exists in 
international anarchy.160 By finally accepting that Russia’s interests were contradictory 
to its own and that security rivalry in a self-help international system dominates 
cooperation, the EU’s eyes opened for a new type of a political process.161 This process 
was more focused on finding ways to manage and resolve conflicts instead of trying 
to reshape the world to resemble the EU.162 However, as the EU did not have the 
political will to counter Russia in its near neighbourhood directly, it veiled the strategic 
goals under declaratory normative objectives.  
Second, the much-discussed mandate of EUAM supports the argument of strategic 
interests. This is to say that pure advising is seen as weak even if the purpose is to 
promote normative goals. However, seen through what realists call ‘strategic 
selectivity of structure’, EUAM can be understood as working within a structure that 
facilitates certain actions and impedes others. 163  In other words, the mission is a 
‘situated actor’ within a structural environment that shapes the possible strategies and 
opportunities at its disposal. 164  In Ukraine, the structural context is shaped by the 
incapable and weak institutions but also by Russia’s strong influence. Therefore, the 
mandate had to be formulated in a way that it would not cause an adverse reaction 
in the Ukrainian or the Russian camp. As a result, the mandate became as 
incontrovertible as possible with just vague references to mentoring and advising. This 
serves the EU’s strategic objectives of not causing further escalations of the conflict 
but also allows EUAM to strategically counter the Russian influence. Yet for advancing 
normative objectives, such as rule of law and democracy, the mandate is too weak. 
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Third, in the previous sections EUAM’s rhetoric and activities were criticised for being 
half-hearted. In some cases, the mission did not engage in reforms that seemed to be 
very similar to other reforms EUAM was working on. From a realist perspective, this is 
understandable as not all the reforms promise the same strategic gains for the EU. In 
the case of the patrol police reform, the EU perhaps perceived that the US, Canada 
and Japan were already handling the process and thus it could allocate its resources 
better by cooperating with the police in the Lviv region. Moreover, EUAM’s work with 
the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service reveals the double-sided interests of the EU. 
On the one hand, EUAM only helped the Service to establish a better communication 
and public relations strategy. On the other hand, the reform clearly helped to counter 
the Russian officials whose functions were deemed better organised on the Russian-
Ukrainian border. Thus, what might look like an incoherent action to outsiders is in reality 
part of the process of the mission evaluating and choosing which reforms have 
strategic, or preferably both strategic and normative, gains to offer.  
Overall, this section shows that the initiative to deploy EUAM Ukraine was indeed 
shaped by “domestic political interests in being seen to ‘do something’”, and 
evidently the instruments the mission uses are more of a normative nature. 165 
Nevertheless, one should not forget that the CSDP is always part of the broader CFSP 
framework and thus – unless the explicit normative and implicit strategic objectives 
happen to coincide – the normative interests are often subordinate to the Union’s 
strategic interests.166 This shows that strategic and normative interests are indeed not 
the same but in EUAM’s case they do not hinder the success of the missions as they 
coincide to a great extent. Achieving stronger democracy, human rights and rule of 
law will at the same time support the strategic goal of the mission to strengthen Ukraine 
against Russia’s influence.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper examined to what extent EUAM has been successful from the EU’s 
perspective. The hypotheses were that the EU had not only normative but also 
strategic objectives behind deploying EUAM, that EUAM has been more successful in 
advancing the EU’s strategic rather than normative objectives, and that the strategic 
objectives may hinder the overall success of mission. 
                                                          
165 Pohl, op. cit., p. 172.   
166 Ibid., p. 171.   
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Supported by realist theory, the findings interestingly show that there are indeed 
strategic objectives behind launching EUAM. If one only assesses the mission’s ability 
of achieving its normative objectives, it can be stated that the mission has not been 
very successful. EUAM has managed to introduce some normative standards in the 
civilian security sector but overall the local buy-in and the estimated sustainability of 
the reforms are low.  
On the other hand, if one only evaluates how well the mission has achieved its 
strategic objectives, EUAM can be seen as a success. The mission has not been very 
successful in pushing through reforms of its liking but it has successfully offered an 
alternative to the Russian model. The Ukrainian civil society clearly prefers the 
European model and is willing to pressure the political leaders to adopt reforms related 
to democracy, rule of law and human rights. This may lead to the strategic objectives 
of the mission eventually contributing to achieving the normative objectives.  
The hypothesis that the strategic interests behind EUAM are hindering the mission’s 
success turned out to be wrong. The mission has focused on concerting its efforts 
through normative means that have, however, achieved some strategic gains. This 
has been facilitated by the fact that strategic and normative objectives behind the 
EUAM largely coincide.   
Overall, the criteria used to evaluate EUAM proved to be apt as they capture the 
internal and external factors that affect the success of the mission. However, the 
evaluation of the success of EUAM so far depends on which objectives matter the 
most to the EU. The Union is evidently still searching for its place as an external actor, 
and the ambiguity about the raison d’être of CSDP continues to handicap 
comprehensive evaluations.167 Thus, the success of EUAM continues to be open for 
different interpretations, and it will also likely remain so. Nevertheless, this paper does 
not exclude that the mission may in the future become a successful example of a new 
type of crisis management mission that tackles complex and hybrid threats and works 
in close conjunction with other EU policies attempting to provide security as well as 
development. 168  For this purpose, based on the findings, the following 
recommendations can be put forward for the attention of EU policy makers: 
1) strengthen the cooperation and coordination between the EU Delegation and 
EUAM so that they would reinforce each other’s actions; 
                                                          
167 Šešelgytė, op. cit.    
168 Gross, “CSDP: between internal constraints and external challenges”, op. cit., p. 39.  
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2) ensure that the new regional presence in Lviv and Kharkiv will work in close 
conjunction with the mission office in Kiev; 
3) issue more public statements especially on negative developments concerning 
ongoing reforms and draft laws in order to get more visibility for the mission; 
4) create a shared vision of the civilian security sector’s future with the Ukrainian 
counterparts; 
5) make Ukraine an example of the EU’s comprehensive approach by concerting the 
mission and European Commission’s instruments to advance the civilian security 
sector reform. 
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